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CASENOTE
REAL PROPERTY LAW: SELLERS' DUTY TO DISCLOSE
MATERIAL FACTS IN USED HOME SALES: OVERDUE
OR OVERPROTECTION?
Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985)
Respondents alleged fraud' in a used home sale and sought return of two
deposits. 2 The trial court limited recovery to the later deposit3 which had been
induced by the seller's affirmative misrepresentation. 4 The Third District Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award and also returned the initial deposit'
based on a finding of passive concealment. 6 On certiorari, 7 the Florida Supreme
Court approved the Third District's decision and HELD, where the seller of
real property has knowledge of facts neither known nor immediately accessible

1. 480 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 1985). Respondents also alleged breach of contract and misrepresentation. Respondents sought escission of the contract and retum of their .deposit. The Florida
Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the claim of breach was without merit. Id. at 627.
2. Id. at 626. In May 1982, respondents entered into a contract to purchase for $310,000
petitioners' three-year-old home. The contract called for an initial deposit of $5,000 followed five
days later by an additional $26,000 deposit payment. Johnson v. Davis, 449 So. 2d 344, 346 (3d
D,C.A. 1984), approved, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
3. 480 So. 2d at 626-27. The trial court made no findings of fact, but awarded the petitioners
$5,000 plus interest and the respondents $26,000 plus interest. Id. at 627.
4. Id. at 626. The petitioners affirmatively misrepresented that there had never been any
problems with the roof or ceiling and that leakage around a window had long since been corrected.
Id.; see also Huffstetler v. Our Home Life Ins. Co., 67 Fla. 324, 324, 65 So. 1, 2-3 (1914) (prima
facie elements of fraudulent misrepresentation in Florida).
5. Johnson v. Davis, 449 So. 2d 344, 347 (3d D.C.A. 1984), approved, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla.
1985). No evidence before the trial court indicated that before receiving the $5,000 initial deposit
payment the petitioners affirmatively misrepresented the condition of the roof to respondents. Id.
There was evidence before the trial court that petitioners later affirmatively misrepresented to the
respondents that there were no problems with the roof and thereafter received the additional $26,000
deposit payment. Id. at 346. On the record, the Third District Court of Appeal found this factual
distinction the only logical basis for explaining the trial court's final judgment. Id. at 347.
6. Id. at 350. The passive concealment was the petitioners' failure to disclose to the respondents their knowledge of defects in the home prior to the respondents providing petitioners
with the initial $5,000 payment. Id, The court imposed this duty upon the petitioners even in the
absence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship. Id. at 347. Contra Banks v. Salina, 413 So. 2d
851 (Fla. 4th DC.A. 1982) (no duty to disclose when parties are dealing at arn's length); Ramel
v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., 135 So, 2d 876 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1961) (dictum) (mere nondisclosure
not actionable unless other party does not have equal opportunity to discover subject fact). The
Third District Court of Appeal acknowledged this authority and declined to follow it. 449 So. 2d
at 347-48.
7, e FLA. CONST, art. V, S 3(bX3) (granting the Florida Supreme Court jurisdiction to
resolve conflicting district court decisions). The holding in Johnson v. Davis, 449 So. 2d 344 (3d
D.C.A. 1984), approved, 480 So, 2d 625 (Fla. 1985), conflicted with Banks v. Salina, 413 So. 2d
B51 (Fla. 4th D.CA, 1982), and Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr, Co., 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1961) (dictum),
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to the buyer, which substantially affect the property's value, the seller has a
legal duty to disclose those facts to the buyer.8
An individualistic philosophy influenced early American common law. 9 The
legal maxim caveat emptor 0 facilitated the industrious endeavors of fledgling
capitalists." Occupied with resolving blatant forms of misfeasance, courts were
2
reluctant to ascribe liability to conflicts involving nonfeasance.'
During this century, the view of the courts has shifted in the opposite
direction.' 3 The doctrine of caveat emptor is approaching obsolescence.' 4 Courts
have extended civil liability for nonfeasance to a larger group of relationships
where one party is particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the other party.1'
This trend to provide greater consumer protection' 6 has influenced the courts'
treatment of passive concealment in used home sales.' 7
8. 480 So. 2d at 629.
9. "The idea has been, so far as possible, to allow everyone to do and to acquire all that
he can. The individualistic conception of justice ... has been the legal conception." Pound, The
Need of a Sociolgi lJwispudence, 19 GaaEN BAG 107 (1907) (quoted in Keeton, Fraud - Concealment
and Non-Disclosure, 15 Tex. L. REv. 1, 5 n.13 (1936)).
10. "Let the buyer beware. This maxim summarizes the rule that a purchaser must examine,
judge, and test for himself." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979); see Hamilton, The Ancient
Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YAL L.J. 1133, 1133-87 (1931) (exhaustive history of caveat emptor);
Comment, Caveat Vendor - A Trend in the Law of Real Property, 5 DEPAUL L. Ray. 263, 264 (1956);
see also Note, Caveat Emptor in the Sale of Real Property - Epitaph to an Inequitable Maxim, 4 MEM.
ST. L. Rav. 54, 54 (1973) (history of caveat emptor doctrine in American law).
11. See Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. 383, 388 (1870). The Supreme Court declared caveat
emptor to be of "such universal acceptance" that, with a single exception, "the courts of all the
states of the union, where the common law prevails .. . sanction it." Id.
12. W. KEETON, D. Doas, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTs 372-73 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND KErON]. Misfeasance is defined
as "active misconduct working positive injury to others." Nonfeasance is defined as "passive
inaction or a failure to take steps to protect [others] from harm." Id.
13. Cooper v. Cordova Sand & Gravel Co., 485 S.W.2d 261, 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971).
See generally Note, Commercial Law - Implied Warranties in Sales of Real Estate - The Trend to Abolish
Caveat Emptor, 22 DEPAUL L. REv. 510 (1972) (survey of caveat emptor history and recent case
law extending liability despite the doctrine); Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in
Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965) (traces history of caveat emptor and proposes extension
of warranties to protect buyers of real property).
14. See Cooper v. Cordova Sand & Gravel Co., 485 S.W.2d 261, 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971)
(lack of privity will not protect vendor from liability); see also 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM &
A. SMITH, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 1063 (4th ed. 1984) (discussing disfavored use of caveat emptor
in home sales); cf. Note, Warranties in the Uniform Land Transactions Act of 1975 - Progression or
Retrogression for Pennsylvania?, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 162, 175 (1975) (decreasing number of jurisdictions
follow caveat emptor).
15. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, at 738. Examples of these relationships include
"principal and agent ... bank and investing depositor .. . old friends," or a number of other
relationships that involve "special trust and confidence." Id.
16. See Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Tax. L. REv. 1, 2 (1953) (development
of law protecting purchaser's reasonable expectations); see also J. MCCALL, CONSUMER PROTECTION
1-44 (1st ed. 1977) (documenting changes in the law creating increased consumer protection against
fraud). But cf. Note, supra note 14, at 176 (many jurisdictions still hold to caveat emptor).
17. See Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960) (latent soil defect creates duty
to disclose if known to seller); Maguire v. Masino, 325 So. 2d 844 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (passively
concealed termite infestation); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 NJ. 445, 317 A.2d 68 (1974) (passively
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In Lingsch v. Savage, 8 the California First District Court of Appeal established
conditions under which a seller's legal duty required disclosure of information
material to the value of real property.' In Lingsch, the seller knew at the time
of sale that the used home was in disrepair, violated the government code and
had been condemned by the city. ' The buyer did not acquire knowledge of
these defects until after completing the conveyance. 2 ' The fraudulent concealment involved nondisclosure of information critical to the transaction rather
22
than the seller's affirmative misrepresentation.
Following his discovery of the used home's actual condition, the buyer sued
for fraud.2 3 The trial court sustained the vendor's demurrer. 24 On appeal, the
First District indicated a finding of actionable fraud25 was contingent upon a
showing that the seller had a legal duty to disclose. "6 Based on the doctrine of
caveat emptor, the seller argued no legal duty to disclose existed where parties
dealt at arm's length.27 Resting its decision on the trend of California case
law,21 the court rejected the application of caveat emptor. 2' The court concluded
where the seller has exclusive knowledge of facts material: °' to the value of the
concealed roach infestation); Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982) (passively concealed
defective foundation).
18. 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963).
19. Id. at 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
20. Id. at 733, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 734, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204. The court established a distinction between active
concealment, defined as deliberate acts to camouflage pertinent facts, and passive concealment, or
the failure to disclose information vital to a buyer's accurate perception of the property. Id.
23. Id. at 732, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
24. Id. at 733-34, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 203. The complaint was dismissed without leave to amend.
Id. at 734, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
25. Id. at 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204. The California statute pertaining to fraud and deceit
in relevant part provides: "The suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who
gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact;
.....

"

CAL. CIV. CODE

S

1710 (West 1963).

26. 213 Cal. App. 2d at 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204. It was established law that the legal
duty existed if the parties shared a fiduciary or other confidential relationship. Here, the court was
presented with a case of passive concealment rather than active concealment, occurring between
parties in neither a fiduciary nor confidential relationship. Id.
27. Id. at 737, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 206; see, e.g., Bacon v. Soule, 19 Cal. App. 428, 439, 126
P. 384, 387 (1912) (no duty to disclose unless there exists a fiduciary or confidential relationship).
28. Crawford v. Nastos, 182 Cal. App. 2d 659, 6 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1960) (vendor bound to
disclose material facts not within diligent observation of vendee); Kallgren v. Steele, 131 Cal. App.
2d 43, 279 P.2d 1027 (1955) (vendor has duty to disclose facts which materially affect desirability
of property); Barder v. McClung, 93 Cal. App. 2d 692, 209 P.2d 808 (1949) (superior knowledge
requires vendor disclose material facts which vendee is not likely to discover); Rothstein v. Janss
Inv. Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 64, 113 P.2d 465 (1941) (vendor is bound to disclose conditions not
visible to vendee); Clauser v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d 453, 112 P.2d 661 (1941) (vendor is bound
to disclose material facts accessible only to vendor).
29. 213 Cal. App. 2d at 737-38, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
30. See id. at 737, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 205-06. The facts undisclosed by the seller to the buyer
must be of sufficient materiality to substantially affect the value of the property. If undisclosed
facts are immaterial, the rule announced by the court is inoperative. Materiality is dependent upon
the particular facts of each case. Id.
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property and beyond the reach of the diligent buyer, the seller has a duty to
disclose those facts to the buyer. '
Other jurisdictions adopted the Lingsch court's criteria for ascertaining the
duty of disclosure in the absence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship."
In Posner v. Davis,3 3 the buyer, after purchasing a used home, discovered that
major leakage problems in the roof had caused ceiling and wall rot.'" During
the first ten months of occupancy the basement flooded a minimum of six
times.M1 At trial, the seller admitted knowing of these problems and testified he
never told the buyer about the defects.16 The trial court found the seller guilty
t
7
of fraud.'
The Illinois First District Appellate Court determined the seller affirmatively
misrepresented " and passively concealed " structural deficiencies from a reasonable buyer.4" Both forms of misconduct constituted fraud. 4 ' The court held the
used home seller liable for nondisclosure of facts pertinent to the value of the
home and outside the knowledge of the diligent buyer. 4 Emphasizing the "amelioration" of caveat emptor and drawing attention to the increased legal protection for home purchasers,43 the court supported a change in the law. 4
31. Id. at 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 204. The court recognized the existence of contradictory
case law but established its holding to conform with the "present tendency," Id. at 737, 29 Cal.
Rptr. at 206.
32. See Saporta v. Barbagelata, 20 Cal. App. 2d 463, 33 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1963), The appellate
court held the seller liable for affirmative misrepresentation and also for mere nondisclosure of
defects known to him but unknown to the buyer. Id. at 474, 33 Cal. Rptr, at 667; sw also Loghry
v. Capel, 257 Iowa 285, 287, 132 N.W.2d 417, 419 (1965) (duty to disclose improperly compacted
ground); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 NJ. 445, 456, 317 A.2d 68, 75 (1974) (duty to disclose
roach infestation); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash. App. 220, 222, 491 P.2d 1312, 1314 (1971) (duty
to disclose soil defect); cf Rich v. Rankl, 6 Conn. Cir, Ct. 185, 189, 269 A.2d 84, 88 (1969)
(duty to disclose drainage defect). But see, e.g., Collier v. Brown, 285 Ala. 40, 42, 228 So. 2d
800, 802 (1969) (no duty to disclose in arm's length transaction).
33. 76 I1. App. 3d 638, 395 N.E.2d 133 (1979).
34. Id. at 640-41, 395 N.E.2d at 135.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 640, 395 N.E.2d at 135.
38. Id. at 642, 395 N.E.2d at 136. The seller removed water damaged tile floor and covered
the same area with a rug. The seller also applied vinyl over a water damaged bedroom wall, Id,
39. Id. at 641, 395 N.E.2d at 135. The seller testified he had knowledge of these matters
but never told the buyer about any of these defects. Id.
40. Id. at 642, 395 N.E.2d at 136. The buyer testified to multiple visits and inspections and
stated he saw nothing to indicate any problems related to roof leakage. Id,
41. Id. at 643-44, 395 N.E.2d at 136-38.
42. Id. The evidence unmistakably indicated the seller knew of yet failed to disclose these
substantial defects to the unknowing diligent buyer. Id.
43. Id. at 644, 395 N.E.2d at 137; see, e.g., Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d
31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979) (demonstrating judicial inclination toward consumer protection),
44. 76 Ill. App. 3d at 644, 395 N.E.2d at 137. The court indicated that, apart from the
affirmative misrepresentation, the seller's knowledge alone created a "duty to speak." Id, at 643,
395 N.E.2d at 137. Furthermore, the court cited Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal, App. 2d 729, 29
Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963). The law in California following Lingsch, now also the law in Illinois, rests
seller liability upon a duty to disclose, even in the absence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship,
Id. at 643-44, 395 N.E.2d at 137.
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Consequently, such a modification of the law created disharmony among
6
jurisdictions. 5 The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal in Banks v. Salina
found no duty to disclose material information in a used home sale absent a
fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties.4 7 In Banks, a buyer
discovered a defect in the swimming pool after purchasing a used home.4 s
Dealing at arm's length with the buyer, the seller testified that he had knowledge
of the poor condition of the pool before the sale. 49 The Fourth District held
passive concealment of facts concerning the quality of the pool nonactionable
based on the relationship of the parties.5" Some courts require absolute disclosure
of material facts regardless of the parties' relationship. 51 Other jurisdictions
impose a conditional duty when the parties share a fiduciary or confidential
relationship. 2
The instant case presented Florida's Supreme Court with an opportunity to
clarify a seller's duty to disclose otherwise unknown and inaccessible facts substantially impacting on the value of a used home. " The petitioners dismissed
54
their duty to disclose as sellers because the parties transacted at arm's length.
"5
Simultaneously rejecting petitioner's argument and previous authority, the instant court declared the reasoning antiquated and inconsistent with modem
precepts of justice and fairness.5 6 Adhering to the guiding philosophy of Lingsch
and Posner,5 7 the instant court determined the seller had an absolute duty to
disclose."'
In briefly reviewing the general demise of caveat emptor and the courts'
ambivalence in expanding liability for nonfeasance, the instant court foreshadowed a change in the law. '9 The instant court determined the petitioners twice
committed fraud through conduct similarly motivated and equally violative of

45. See Keeton, supra note 16, at 4.
46. 413 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982).
47. Id. at 852; see also Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808
(1942) (no duty to disclose termite infestation). The Swinton court acknowledged "the plaintiff
possesses a certain appeal to the moral sense" but concluded the law has not "reached the point
of imposing upon the frailties of human nature a standard so idealistic as this." 311 Mass. at 677,
42 N.E.2d at 808-09.
48. 413 So. 2d at 852.
49. Id. The parties openly discussed and contracted to repair the roof of the home but the
condition of the pool remained undiscussed and undisclosed. Id. at 852-53.
50. Id. at 852; see, e.g., Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1961) (no duty to disclose in arm's length transaction).
51. E.g., Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 201; Posner, 76 Ill. App. 3d
at 638, 395 N.E.2d at 133; see supra text accompanying notes 18-44.
52. E.g., Collier v. Brown, 285 Ala. 40, 228 So. 2d 800 (1969); Banks, 413 So. 2d at 851;
see supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
53. See 480 So. 2d at 625.
54. Id. at 628.
55. See supra note 7.
56. 480 So. 2d at 628.
57. Id. at 628-29.
58. Id. at 629.
59. Id. at 628.
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justice and fairness. 60 First, fraud was committed by passive concealment, or
simply failing to speak; second, fraud was committed by affirmative misrepresentation, or failing to speak the truth. 6' Holding the petitioners liable for passive
concealment although the parties dealt at arm's length, the instant court introduced new law in Florida.

62

In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Boyd criticized the court for increasing
seller liability in a market already providing sufficient protection for the prudent
buyer. 63 Chief Justice Boyd believed the broad distinction between liability for
64
passive concealment and affirmative misrepresentation should be preserved.
The Chief Justice concluded that liability for passive concealment was the "first
step" toward calamitous after-sale judgments, increasing inalienability of homes,
and sellers becoming "guarantors" of their homes' useful condition."5
The instant case represents an undisguised adoption of the law advanced
by Lingsch and Posner.66 In all three cases, the courts attempted to allocate the
legal duties of buyers and sellers in a typical used home sale.67 Judicial delegation of these duties should accommodate the current needs of a dynamic
marketplace. 6 The instant court followed Lingsch and Posner and overruled Banks
to more effectively achieve that end. 69
The instant court's efforts to eradicate caveat emptor and expand seller
liability for passive concealment assumes the buyer is vulnerable and dependent
upon the seller.7" The instant court's progressive posture permits neither seller's
affirmative exploitation nor his silence to later injure the disadvantaged buyer. 7'
These contemporary concepts of fair dealing function irrespective of the under-

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 628-29.
Id. at 627-28.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-50 (describing Florida law prior to instant case).
480 So. 2d at 629-31 (Boyd, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Boyd also attacked the

majority for relying on insufficient evidence to reach its holding and claimed there were adequate
contractual provisions to resolve the conflict. Id. at 629-30.

64. Id. at 631.
65. Id. Chief Justice Boyd forecasted the instant decision would serve as a catalyst for an
increasing level of seller liability which would eventually produce a host of undesirable consequences
in property law. Id.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31 & 42-44. The instant court's holding is practically
a word-for-word quote of the holding in Lingsch. The instant court directly evidences agreement
with the reasoning and philosophy of Lingsch. See 480 So. 2d at 629.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 18-44 & 53-62.
68. Holmes v. Worthey, 159 Ga. App. 262, 265, 282 S.E.2d 919, 922 (1981) (quoting Amos
v. McDonald, 123 Ga. App. 509, 511-12, 181 S.E.2d 515, 517-18 (1971)).
[T]he common law as a vehicle of justice ... possesses an infinite capacity to grow,
to keep abreast of current requirements, and to be alert to changing needs and mores.
...The law should be based on current concepts of what is right and just and the
judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for keeping its common law principles
abreast of the times.
159 Ga. App. at 265, 282 S.E.2d at 922; see also Wilhite v. Mays, 140 Ga. App. 816, 818, 232
S.E.2d 141, 143 (1976).
69. 480 So. 2d at 628-29.
70. Id. at 628.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57 & 70.
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stood relationship between parties. The duty to disclose is absolute. 72 The instant
court's displeasure with the inequities of caveat emptor and its endorsement of
liability for passive concealment expands the seller's accountability. Even though
the instant court's position represents the trend of recent cases, 73 the decision
remains subject to criticism for overprotecting the buyer and overextending seller
liability.7 4
The prospect of unchecked liability from passive concealment arguably places
a severe burden on the seller. 7' However, the instant court established parameters of seller liability through the language of its holding. 76 Liability for passive
concealment is limited to disclosure of substantive facts materially affecting the
value of the used home. 77 Rather than overwhelming the seller with increased
liability, the instant court simply ensured the buyer's right to full and fair
disclosure. 7s In Lingsch, Posner and the instant case, the passively concealed facts
were material to the defects the buyers were subsequently forced to redress. 79
The instant decision stimulates pre-sale disclosure of important facts and promotes their inclusion in the bargaining calculus.
Limiting the duty of disclosure to material facts known to the seller controls
the danger of runaway seller liability. However, the instant court still arguably
overprotects buyers. The instant holding required the seller to disclose material
facts not readily observable or known to the buyer."' Since the seller cannot
intuitively discern what is readily observable or known to the buyer, the seller
must disclose every conceivable material fact to avoid liability."1 The buyer's
legal responsibility to inspect is reduced to easily observable material facts;r 2
practically, his responsibility may be further diminished.
Unlike Lingsch and Posner, the instant holding eliminated language imposing
a standard of diligence and alertness upon the buyer.8 3 The instant court forced

72. 480 So. 2d at 628. The instant court overruled conflicting authority and described conflicting cases as "unappetizing." Id.
73. Id.; see also PROSSER AND KEEroN, supra note 12, at 739 (describing the tendency of most
courts in recent years to find a duty to disclose).
74. 480 So. 2d at 629-31 (Boyd, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 629 (Boyd, C.J. dissenting). Chief Justice Boyd stated that the instant court's
decision "will give rise to a flood of litigation." Id.
76. Id. at 628-29.
77. Id.
78. Id. The instant court observed the law is moving in the direction of requiring total
disclosure of every material fact that would be necessary to fulfill fundamentally fair conduct. Id.
at 628.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 18-44 & 53-62; see also Keeton, supra note 16, at 6.
"It is enough to be material that the undisclosed fact affected, in a substantial way, the value of
the subject matter of the sale." Id.
80. 480 So. 2d at 629.
81. Se id. at 628.
82. See id. at 631 (Boyd, C.J., dissenting). If the seller is obligated to disclose all material
facts not readily observable, the buyer is, at most, required to discover material facts easily seen.
See id.
83. Id. at 629. The Florida Supreme Court, while practically quoting the holding in Lingsch
and Posner, specifically excluded any reference to "diligent" in describing the buyers' attention and
observation during inspection of the home. Id. at 628-29; cf. Lingsch, 213 Cal. App. 2d at 735,
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full and fair disclosure on the seller and disregarded the buyer's level of investigative acumen.8 As a result, the instant court substantially protects the
buyer and places the greater burden of communication between the parties on
the seller. However, this increased burden of communication is not disproportionate to the more extensive knowledge typically possessed by the seller.,,
Therefore, by promoting seller communication, the instant holding provided
justice and fairness.16
In his dissent, Chief Justice Boyd refuted the instant court's attempt at
justice and fairness.87 He based his dissent on the tenuous presupposition that
sellers are not better positioned than buyers to evaluate the quality and worth
of their homes.ss Lingsch, Posner and the instant case suggest the contrary.89
Assuming these cases represent the marketplace, even prudent buyers cannot
obtain knowledge of material facts sufficient to dismiss the seller's duty to
disclose. Thus, rather than exposing any specific injustice or unfairness in the
instant decision, the dissent focused attention on the instant court's contribution
to a continuing trend that might ultimately lead to such a result.'
The extreme repositioning of legal duties by a progressive judiciary is a
legitimate, though premature, concern in the instant case. Rather than disproportionately favoring the buyer, the instant decision pragmatically modifies the
law to neutralize the inherent inequalitites in contemporary seller-buyer relationships. 9 ' First-time used home buyers are disadvantaged by their lack of
experience. All used home buyers are somewhat vulnerable and dependent and
must place trust in the seller. Knowledge of the seller's home acquired through
residence is superior io knowledge the buyer obtains in the course of a few
visits. Therefore, public policy warrants the seller's full disclosure of material
facts undiscovered by the diligent buyer during his inspection of the used home.y0
Rather than forcing a seller to convey a flawless used home, this higher standard
of accountability simply forces the seller to reveal it is not without flaw. The
idealistic goal of balancing rights and duties of buyers and sellers requires a

29 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (buyer's observation of property described as "diligent"); Posner, 76 Ill.
App.
3d at 644, 395 N.E.2d at 137 (quoting Lingsch).
84. 480 So. 2d at 629. The Florida Supreme Court discounted the rarer instances where the
parties are equally sophisticated and automatically placed the burden of communication on the
seller. The duty to disclose is absolute. See supra text accompanying note 72.
85. See supra text accompanying note 70.
86. See 480 So. 2d at 628.
87. Id. at 631 (Boyd, CJ., dissenting). The Chief Justice predicted the instant holding would
frequently facilitate unjust results. Id. at 629.
88. Id. at 630.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 18-44 & 53-62.
90. 480 So. 2d at 631 (Boyd, CJ., dissenting).
91. Id. at 628-29; see also Note, supra note 10, at 54 (recognizing the dynamic of the marketplace); cf R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 463 (3rd ed. 1981) (addressing changes
in law corresponding to a changed marketplace). The doctrine of caveat emptor was fundamentally
based on arm's length transactions and presupposed comparable skill and experience. In view of
current technology and the practices of the contemporary market the circumstances that justified
the exercise of caveat emptor no longer exist. Id.
92. &e supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
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consideration of their competing interests in the prevailing market. By expanding
the seller's duties, the instant court came closer to achieving this elusive goal.
Marshall K. Jaquish
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